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Juveniles and the
Ability to Form Intent to Kill
Elisa Clementst

juveniles are often not folly capable offorming intmt to kill, and courts should
consider a juvenile's cognitive decision-making ability and psychological dist1-ess
at the time ofthe crime.

T

he number of homicides committed by juveniles between the ages of
fourteen and seventeen skyrocketed after 1985, even surpassing the rates
of older age groups.• In 1998 alone the Federal Bureau of Investigation
reported approximately seven percent (1,169 of 16,019) of murder and nonnegligenr manslattghter arrests were made of children under the age of eighteen.1These statistics are disturbing when viewed collectively, and even more
so when considered on an individual basis. The perpetrators of these violent
acts are not the typical "hardened" criminals; they are mere children. Yet
their actions are not the actions of children, thus raising several questions
when considering how to handle such youthful criminals. Behind the hand
that pulls the trigger is there a fully functioning mental process and conscience capable of comprehending the magnitude of such an act? What is
really going on ins ide the mind and heart of a juvenile killer? Is this teenager
a killer in the same sense that an adult criminal is a killer?
As violent youth are brought co trial, an essential issue facing the courts
is determining the juvenile's ability to form intent to kill. The developmental
differences between juveniles and adults demand that higher scrutiny be given
to determining intent. More so than adults, juveniles have a larger number

t A nativt of San Francisco, dements is a senior graduating with university honors ''~th a
B.A. in English and a minor in business. She is interested in pursuing a J.D./M.B.A. :md
working as an executive.
'James Alan Fox and Marianne Zawitz, "Homicide Trends in the U.S.,'' Crime and Justice
Electronic Data Abstracts, <hrrp//:www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/homicide/reens.htm>, 4 April 1001.
' Da~d M. Shumaker and Geoffre~, R. McKee, "Characteristics of Homicidal and Violent
Juveniles,~ Violmcr ami Victims 16, no. 4 ( 1001) : 401.
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of influences that would hinder their ability to form intent. As a result, juveniles are often not fully capable of forming intent to kill, and courts
should consider a juvenile's cognitive decision-making ability and psychological distress at the time of the crime. These two factors require a higher
level of scruriny to determine intent in juvenile homicide cases.
PRESENT STATE OF

LAw REGARDING INTENT

Intent is an essential element ro establishing guile in murder cases. Inrent to commit a specific crime, or mens 1-ea, must be proven in order for a
conviction co be made. 3 However, rhe law regarding intent varies from jurisdiction ro jurisdiction. Federal law specifies that murder is a "specific intent
crime" and thus, "proof that [the] deed was done with premeditation is necessary.''• And yet intent is nor a tangible element; it must be inferred through
other means. Federal Law specifies the following:
Law art'3ches intent to every act rhar is not accident and, under predecessor to 1& USC$ § Illl, every act that produces death that is OUtside definition of "accident"- something occurring after exercise of care that law
requires to be exercised to prevent occurrence-is intentional, whether
growing out of specific design to mke Life or growing out of gross carelessness or arising from condirion of mind prompring engagement in some
other wrongful or criminal act in execution of which life is taken.;

Today the courts are split on rhls issue of identifYing intent or mens 1-ea;
some allow psychological evaluations as evidence while others disregard such
considerations. Because intent is a function of psychological and menral
processes, it is logical that psychological analysis would be a major consideration of juvenile homicide cases. Indeed John Parry, director of the ABA
Commission on Mental and Physical Disability Law and Eric Y. Orogin,
associate clinical professor of psychiatry and behavioral sciences at the
University of Louisville School of Medicine, assert that "often, lack of intent
·'John Parry and Eric Y. Drogin, Criminal lAw H.mdbook on Psychiatric and Psycbowgical
Evidence and Tmimony (Chicago: The American Bar Association, 2000), 12.
' 18 USCS § Ull (2001) II, 10.
' Ibid.
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is based on mental impairment."6 However, the psychological approach
yields many conflicting results. A number of recent cases have dealt with
the required mental state of the offender necessary to establish intent and the

culpability of the accused. The Illinois Supreme Courr ruling in People v.
]ones (1979) ruled in contradiction to the federal legal interpretation, that intent m ust include a specific desire to kill a person. The court clarified their
definition with the statement "knowledge that the consequences of an accused's act may result in death (or grave bodily injury), or intent to do bodily harm, is not enough."' As the commentators point out, "it would appear
that knowledge that the consequences of one's act may result in death does
nor satisfy the specific intent requirement for attempted murder."• Thus if
homicide offenders were not aware that their actions would lead to death,
then they could not be considered to have the requisite intent to kill. This
ruling is a much broader interpretation than the federal statement that intent be necessarily involved in "every act that produces death that is outside
definition of 'accident."'9 Whether intent is an inherent component of a
homicidal crime or a separate entity remains subject to debate.
An additional concern regarding mens rea that has divided the courts
handling homicide cases is the question of allowing expert psychiatric evidence to establish the presence or absence of intent at the rime of the murder. Two state supreme court cases, United States v. Bmwner (United States
Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit) and State v. Wilcox
(Supreme Court of Ohio), stand at opposite ends of the issue. The court
ruled in the Brawner case that "the defendant did not have the specific mental state required for a particular crime or degree of crime-even though he
was aware that hi.s act was wrongful and was able to control it, and hence was
not entitled ro complete exoneration." 10 It was proved that his mental state
at the time of the crime was of such nature that he could nor be held

• Parry and Drogin, 12.
-P~opl~ v. jon~ (1979), 81 lL ul1, -f05 NE1d 343, qtd. in Sanford H. Kadish :md Stephen
]. Schulhofer, Criminal Law and Irs Prousm (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1995), 588.
* Kadish and Schulhofer, 588.
' I8 USCS § UII (1001) U-10.
10
Uniud Stat~ u Brawn~r, United States Coun of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit
471 F2d 969 (1972), qtd. in K.'ldish and Schulhofer, 999·
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responsible ro the same degree, for the reason that "an offense like deliberated and premeditated murder requires a specific intent that cannot be satisfied merely by showing that defendant failed to conform to an objective
standard."'' The defendant's "abnormal mental condition" was judged to have
overridden the possibility of forming intent and premeditating the murder. 1z
In the Wilcox case, however, the defendant, who was charged with aggravated felony murder during a burglary, was folmd by psychiatrists to suffer from several mental disabilities yer the judge would not allow these mental
conditions to be permitted in court as evidence of his ability or lack thereof
co form intent. Primarily he denied that "the defendant's mental condition
could negate the specific intents required for aggravated murder and aggravated burglary."u This single decision of psychological evidence completely
altered the outcome of the Wilcox case. BecallSe the element of intent cannor be determined by physical evidence, it mllSt be inferred by ocher means,
which are essential to the judgment of a murder crime.
Courts and legislatures remain divided along the lines of the
Brawner/Wilcox decisions. In accordance with Wilcox, many recent decisions have ruled char psychiatric evidence is "never admissible" for proving
the mental state and ability ro form intent of a defendant.' 4 Yet the federal
courts and approximately half the states "continue to favor the Brawner view
that expert psychiatric evidence should be admissible whenever relevant to
negate the mens rea of a specific intent crime.'''s The Model Penal Code
comments regarding this issue:
The Insticute perceived no justification for a limitation on evidence that
may bear significandy on a determinacion of dte mental state of the defendant at the time of the commission of the crime. If states of mind are
accorded legal significance, psychiatric evidence should be admissible

11
/bid.
" Ibid.

" Stutr v. \Vi/cox, 436 NE 1.d OH 513 (198z), qtd. in Kadish and Schulhofer, 1000.
• Ibid.,
Ibid.

IS
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when relevant to prove or clisprove their existence to the same extent as w y
other relevant evidence. 16
The state of the law regarding intent to kill is complicated. The vast difference between interpretations illustrated in the case of People v. Jones and
the Brawner and Wilcox decisions make our examination of intent likewise
difficult. Interpreting "intent to kill" remains a perplexing issue, but given
the psychological and mental processes involved in the act offorming intent,
courts that allow a psychological approach to the issue are headed in the
right direction. The decision of the Brawner case accurately allows the mental capacity of a defendant to be considered in establishing intent. The psychological evidence in the Brawner case proved that the mental state of the
defendant limited his ability to form incenr. Juvenile killers are especially
susceptible to psychological factors that could impair their ability to form intent. We will now consider two of those factors: cognitive development and
emotional distress at the time of the crime.
CoGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT

Given the significance of psychological evidence in evaluating a defendant's intent, we must examine the dominant psychological factors influencing teenagers in these moments of crisis. Although many fields of
psychology pertain to juvenile behavior, developmental psychology is particularly helpful in exploring the differences between juvenile and adult
offenders, and it provides valuable research and theory regarding their cognitive decision-making abilities.
Eliz.1beth Scott, professor of law ac the University of Virginia Law
School, explains that there are various ways in which developmental issues
could adversely affect adolescent decision making. 1" In considering the cognitive development of adolescents-that part which affects reasoning and

•• Model Penal Code and Commentaries, Comment to §4.02 at 219 (1985) , qed. in Kadish
and Schulhofer, 1004.
,. Elizabedt S. Scon:, "Criminal Responsibility in Adolescence: Lessons from Dcvelopmenml Psychology," in Youth on Trial (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2.000), 199·
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understanding--Scott presents a wide range of research with conflicting results suggesting both that teenagers have abilities similar to adults and chat
they are significantly limited when compared ro adults.•• However despite
the contradictory conclusions, Scott insists in her analysis chat "the research
does nor demonstrate rhe youthful cognitive decision-making capacity is like
that of adulcs."1q She finds fault with the studies that demonstrate adolescents' ability tO be equal to adults, and she submits the following as likely
developmemal differences char would preclude a teenager's ability ro form
inrenr: (x) "adolescents may use informacion differently from adults. They
may consider different or fewer options in tl1inking about tl1eir available
choices or in identifYing consequences when comparing alternacives," 20
(2) "Substantial theoretical arguments hold that while older adolescents may
have adult-like capacities for reasoning, they may not deploy those capacities
as uniformly across different problem-solving situations as do adults, and
they may do so less dependably in ambiguous or stressful situacions,"z•
and (3) "Adolescents, for developmental reasons, could differ from adults in
the subjective value chat is assigned co perceived consequences in the process
of making choices."12 These three facrors could significandy prevent an adolescenr from possessing the requisite ability to form incenr to kill.
Limited ability to process and comprehend che magnitude of homicidal
actions may preclude the formation of specific murder intent in a teenager's
mind. In contrast to adults, adolescents are more prone to be lacking in
these areas responsible for creating intent. Although some adult killers may
also lack fi.ill development in these areas, as a group, juveniles are more likely
to have insufficient cognitive development. And in addition to the normal
developmental differences between adolescents and adults, Alan Kazdin

11

Ibid., 299.
•• Ibid. , 302.
'"Ibid., 305. See also C. Lewis, "How Adolescents Approach Decisions: Changes over
Grades Seven to Twelve and Policy Implications,• Cbild Development 51 (1981}: 538-44.
"Ibid., 306. See also J. Flavell, P. Miller and S. Miller, Cognitive Devewpmmr, 3rd ed.
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. 1993), and L. Sceinber and E. Cauffman, "Maturity of
Judgment in Adolescence: Psychosocial Factors in Adolescem Decision Making," Law and
Human Bebavior 20 (1996): 3·
" Ibid., 306. Seo= also L. Furby and R. Beyth-Marom, "Risk Taking in Adolescence: A
Decision-Making Perspective," Development Review 11 (1990): 1-44.
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from the Yale University Department of Psychology adds that when considering the decision-making abilities of delinquent adolescents, one must
understand "the fact that, as a group, these youths have a much higher rate
of mental disorders than do adolescents in general. These disorders can
directly impair decision making insofar as symptoms of various mental
disorders (such as impulsiveness and cognitive deficiencies) guide actions in
everyday situations.'' 23 An adolescent's limited cognitive decision-making
ability inhibits a clear ability to form intent. Defendants should not be held
completely accountable for something over which they have limited ability.
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

As a further limitation to juveniles' ability to form intent to kill, some
researchers of adolescent homicide trends are now voicing the opinion that
extreme emotional duress or other overwhelming psychological conditions
may render adolescent homicide offenders unable to rationally understand
their actions as they are committed. Professor Michael D. Kelleher of the
California State College system examines the increasingly frequent cases in
which seemingly good, normal teenagers acted violently when overcome by
emotions of rage or fear. He explains that "for some individuals, adolescent
rage overpowers a11 else in their lives and impels them to a moment of explosive violence that is beyond our understanding and rheirs."z4 In effect
these teenagers kill without recognizing what they are doing.
The horrifyingly common occurrence of adolescent perpetrated
neonaticide, or the killing of an infant within twenty-four hours after birth,
may attest to this phenomenon. Within the United Stares, it is estimated
that berween three to four hundred infants die each year due ro neonacicide,
tl1ough the actual number is probably much higher.~s One such case
occurred in January 1986 when a sixteen-year-old Wisconsin girl gave birth

!.> Alan E. Kazdin, ·Adolescenr Developmenr, Menral Disorders, and Decision Making of
Delinquent Youths," Youth on Trial, ed. Thomas Grisso and Robert G. Schwartz (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2000), 34·
" Michael Kelleher, Wbm Good Kids Kill (Westporr, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1998), 81.
!S

Ibid.,

IJ.
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after concealing her pregnancy from her parents for eight monrhs. She bore
the infant at home and then killed it by stabbing it with a knife. She
wrapped me body in a plastic bag and hid it in me garage of her parents'
home. After the body was discovered, the teenager was brought ro trial and
pleaded guilty to one cowu of second-degree murder. When she was questioned regarding her motive for killing her child, she answered "mat she was
desperately afraid of what those around her, especially her parents, would
think of her if rhey discovered that she was pregnant." 26 This teenager as well
as other perpetrators of neonaticide seem to have been overwhelmed by feelings of fear as well as a denial of reality as they committed their crimes.
The majority of rhese neonaticide cases appear to have occurred completely without forethought or rational comprehension. Though the scams
and condition of the morher varies widely in terms of education, socioeconomic conditions and family background, Kelleher identifies two elemenrs common in almost every case: (1) "fear of the birth of her child and
the impending, seemingly overwhelming, responsibilities of motherhood,
which signal rhe collapse of her adolescent life as she knows it," and
(2) "srrong, often insurmountable, denial of her own pregnancy."~' The female adolescents examined in Kelleher's smdy aH came from stable, middleclass homes with nonviolent histories. They performed well in school and
were expected to excel in life. Faced wirh pregnancy most did not seek abortions and instead worked (quite successftilly) to hide their pregnancies from
parents and friends.~8 They usually felt loneliness and guilt and an overwheLning sense of fear mat increased as the time of birrh arrived. Yet in spite
of rhcir conscious efforts to hide the pregnancies, most had no premeditated
plan to murder their children once they were born. Kelleher explains that
when a teenage mother does commit neonaticide,
it is almost always her first significant act of violence against another
human being. In this sense, it is an unexpected, terrifying momenc of fatal
aggression that is sometimes as incomprehensible to the juvenile murderer
as it is to those who later learn of the deed. When the teenage mother

"' Ibid.. 16.
,. Ibid., I-f.

" Ibid.
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murders her infant, ir is rarely, if ever, anything bur a desperate act that
horrifyingly demonstrates her wlShakable conviction thar, to her, there
were no other options. "29
Morris Brozovsky, assistant professor of psychiatry at State University's
Downtown Medical Center in Brooklyn, New York, who has studied cases
of neonaticide comments that this group of adolescent offenders "will deny
that they are pregnant until the delivery, and the stress of the delivery will
put them into a brief psychotic state."·'0
Defendants in neonaticide cases have argued that they could not form
intent to kill because of the overwhelming feelings of fear and denial. Courts
have differed in their acceptance of this defense, but the trend established in
previous homicidal case rulings involving psychologically disturbed offenders should have bearing on neonaticide cases. Indeed, in the case of Kleeman
v. United States Parole Commission, in which the mental abilities of a defendant were under question, the court ruled that the defendant's crime was
comparable to voluntary manslaughter instead of second-degree murder, because in "her extremely irrarional and paranoid state of mind brought about
by external manipulation of her already confused thinking, she could not
have formed intent to kill necessary to establish malice.''·11
These cases of neonaricide present conditions of intent to kill that are
very different from the cold-blooded murder of other homicide siruations.
The emotional trauma surrounding the pregnancy creates a situation in
which a teenager might not fully understand the extent of her actions. Feelings of fear, shame, and denial are possibly so overwhelming that a mother
could murder her child without actual intent to kill.
Neonaticide is only one example in which a teenage killer acts without
full intent co kill. Many other traumatic situations could place an adolescent
in a position in which he or she is overwhelmed by the consequences of
a decision, perceives limited possibilities, and kills out of fear or denial. A
teenager in this situation does not have the capacity to form intent to kill.

" Ibid., 15.
Morris Brozovsky, qrd. in Kelleher, 19.
" Kinman v. United Sraw Parok Commission, 125 F3d 725.
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CoNCLUSION

An adolescem killer's ability to form intent to kill cannot be viewed in
che same Light as rhe ability of adult killers. The rwo major psychological factors influencing teenagers in these situations, cognitive decision-making
ability and extreme emotional distress, must be taken into considera tion
when a defendant's guilt is being determined. These issues require that a
higher standard of inquiry be determined and applied w inferring a juvenile's intent to kill.

